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FOREWORD 
The sixth annual meeting of the Far Eastern Association held in New York 
City April 13-15, 195h, included a symposium on traditio.nal society in South­
east Asia which was opened by Professor Cady with the paper here reproduceda 
This• discussion of nati·7e Burmese government and acirninistration was followed 
by papers on 11The Vietnam State Prior to French Occupation" by Milto.n Sacks 
of Yale University, and 11The Strength of the Autocratic Tradition in Thailand" 
by Walter Vella of the University of California. It is expected that these 
last two papers w ill be published elsewhere in the near future. 
Before the war Dr. Cady taught history at Judson College in Rangoon. 
During and after the war he served with the Department of State both in 
Washington and in Burma before taking up his present position in the Department 
of History at Ohio University. During most of 1952 and into 1953, Dr. Cady 
was Visiting Professor in the Department of History and in the Southeast 
Asia Program at Cornell University. The Program staff wishes to express its 
appreciation to Professor Cady for his permission to issue this brief study 
in its present form. 
Lauri$ton Sharp, Director 
Southeast Asia Program 
Department of Far Eastern Studies 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, New York 
April, 1954 
Political Institutions of Old Burma 
The concept of divine kingship which prevailed in old Burma was based 
on immemorial sanctions derived mainly from India. These included the 
physical fact of royal political and military dominance, the assiduous 
ministrations of Br�hman priests who were in perennial attendance at the 
Burmese Court, plus the principle of Karma, which attributed one's personal 
status in the present life to the inexorable outcome of deeds performed in 
a previous existence. Popular reverence was accorded to the ruler concretely 
considered, securely installed in his palace, authenticated by royal lineage 
preferably on both sides of the family, supported by the panoply of religious 
and political symbols of authority. The king was invariably addressed as a 
lower form of deity, a practice requiring special vocabulary and modes of 
speech. To the king the Burman nation granted unquestioned acceptance of 
the ruler's right to control the lives and property and to command the 
personal services of all of his subjects. Except for those high functionaries 
of the government who owed their position to royal favor, there probably 
·existed little or no feeling of loyalty for the king personally. 
The royal family stood distinctly apart from the population as a whole, 
for Burmese society, even though stratified, included no hereditary nobility 
or caste distinctions outside the Court circle. Partly because of the 
qualitative superiority of royalty, the king i.nvariably married a number of 
his half-sisters or cousins, and a usurping ruler, if a brother, sometimes 
acquired the wives as well as the throne of his predecessor. Male children 
born to the ruler 1 s principal wives (customarily four in number) plus surviving 
royal brothers and the chief queen were accorded by hereditary right places 
of honor in public affairs and the enjoyment of the government's share of 
the revenues collectable from designated units of the kingdom. 
Brahman priests at Court contributed substantially _to the aura of royal 
divinity by performing their rituals at coronation ceremonies and at all 
formal audiences of the ki.ng. During the coq.rse of one British mission in 
the 1790's, the Burmese king requested urgently that as rulers of India the 
British demonstrate tl1eir friendship by furnishing him with a genuine Brahman 
priest accompanied by an equally valid Brahman 1tJife, both to reside at the 
Burmese capital. From India also came the traditions that the king alone 
merited the white umbrella and that all the elephants were the exclusive 
property of the king and could be ridden only by his express consent. · The 
white elephant was in fact an emanation of deity, and enjoyed the services 
of high officials plus the revenues from an extensive estate for its upkeep. 
To serve his royal master as "slave" was the highest ho.nor a Burman 
subject could attain. The title accorded to all high officials in the 
government was that of wun, mea.ning "burden" or 11 burden-bearer0 ; it was the 
esteemed privilege of these wuns to bear.on their heads the burden of the 
"golden feet" of the king. For anyone else but the king to put a Burman 
under foot was to inflict an insufferable humiliation; for the divine king 
to do it was, by contrast, to bestow an .honor. Criminal law operated as an 
expressio.n of the will of the ruling .sovereign; his death or depositio.n 
ordinarily meant the remission of all fines and the summary pardo.n of all 
criminal offenders convicted during his reign. Formal civil court procedure 
was also an affair of the king's officials, The untrammeled sovereignty of 
the monarch was thus the essential sanction behind all governmental authority. 
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In the abeyance of that authority virtual anarchy prevailed until such time 
as a new ruler was firmly installed in the palace. The only notable exceptions 
to this rule·were in the area of local government, where the vestiges of the 
authority of the primitive tribal chief survived. 
The exclusive status attaching to the person of the king applied also 
to his capital city and more particularly to the fortified environs of the 
inner palace. Selected military regiments garrisoned the capital area at all 
times, while trusted army leaders guarded the four gates of the palace itself. 
No unauthorized person of whatever rank or dignity was permitted to bring a 
weapon into the sacred palace precincts, and no important prince could so 
much as enter the palace when the ki.ng was absent from it. Weak kings never 
left the palace at all. Fearful ones eliminated all rivals, if possible. 
Because dynastic or national misfortune was customarily associated with the 
anger of the spirit inhabiting an obviously inauspicious palace site, the 
relocation of the capital was frequently regarded as necessary. New locations 
were selected with the help of diviners, astrologers and nwnerologists, mainly
of Hindu training, to whose pronouncements high deference was paid. Four 
separate Burma capitals were occupied during the troubled 35 years from 1822 
to 1857 despite the terrific hardship and expense which each shift entailed. 
Some of the outward symbols of royalty were clearly of Chinese origin.
Mr. Desai records that in 1837 the victorious usurper, Prince Tharrawaddy, 
paused briefly at a private pala·ce shrine to do obeisance to miniature images
representing the spirits of his royal ancestors. The Burmans also imitated 
the Chinese practice of restricting the wearing of the yellow girdle or belt 
to the Imperial clansmen, plus the allocation of appropriate sashes for the 
nine grades of Chinese civil service officials. The Burman Court indicated 
gradations of rank by using the tsaloe, a sash composed of multiple strands 
of golden-colored rope fastened together over the left shoulder and on the 
breast and run.ning under the right arm. The king merited a tsaloe of twe.nty­
four strands, the heir-apparent one of eighteen, and the minor princes one of 
twelve. Royal officials of the Court and in the provinces wore tsaloes of 
nine, six, and three strands·according to their respective levels of authority.
Only the king could merit the use of the peacock emblem, while the wearing of 
anklets, brocaded silk, and precious stones was reserved exclusively for· 
royalty. Golden and red umbrellas were permitted minor dignitaries. Old 
Burma tolerated no unseemly strutting about by social climbers, especially
in the vicinity of the capital. No more serious political offense could be 
committed than to pretend to a dignity or social status for which one was 
not qualified. 
As a general rule the Burmese king stood apart from the official adminis­
trative agencies oft·the government. These centered at the Hlutdaw Yon, or 
Royal Council Hall, located adjacent to but outside the inner palace enclosure. 
The great Wuns (Wungyis) of the Hlutdaw Court, usually four in number, were 
selected in theory and usually in fact on the basis of their sagacity and 
administrative experience. Theirs was the ultimate responsibility for decisions 
covering all- phases of the central governme.nt, executive, legislative, judicial 
or military. All major governmental actions were issued in the name of the 
Hlutdaw. They acted as a group in making their decisions, al though an 
individual Wungyi often took over administrative supervision of functions in 
which he had special competence. The king or the Crown Prince on rare 
occasions actually presided over the deliberations of the Hlutdaw Council. 
Its actions in any case were reviewed on a daily basis by the ruler, with the 
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assistance of a separate group of Privy Counsellors functioning inside the 
palace walls. Although the king could elevate or degrade Hlutdaw members at 
will, he did not as a rule interfere arbitrarily with the considered decisions 
of the Council. 
Government functioned at its optimum effectiveness when the Hlutdaw was 
ably manned and was supported by the king in the exercise of its best judgment. 
Government was best near the capi ta.l; it was less effective in distant areas 
where abuses could not easily be checked. A bigoted or irresponsible ruler 
could deny the lll.utdaw any real power and operate through personal favorites. 
The progressive weakening of governmental authority under such conditions 
eventually would plunge the entire kingdom into a condition of semi-anarchy. 
Political disaffection would take the form of support for a rival prince­
pretender. Only if the king retained full control of affairs until the end 
of his reign and saw his designated heir firmly installed within the palace 
fortress prior to his passing could the succession be accomplished without 
untoward incident. Eve.n then much confusion ensued, because all major 
governmental posts and fiefs were subject to reassignment by the new sovereign. 
The principal defects of royal government in old Burma stemmed from its 
despotic character and from the uncertainty of succession to the throne. 
In the administrative aspects of government the Burma Court followed the 
general pattern of the Chinese system, no doubt because of its periodic 
contacts with Peking. Chinese practice was reflected not only in the assign­
ment of regional Viceroys and Governors, but also in the appointment to 
important posts of Burma.n officials highly literate in both Burmese and Pali. 
These latter served as secretaries, scribes, and readers within the palace 
itself, at the Hlutdaw Yon, and at the seats of provincial.Governors. The 
Wundauk assistants to the respective members of the Hlutdaw Council, who had .
charge of its agenda and did much of its work, were invariably young men of 
ability and training. The usual road for a promising man ambitious for 
political preferment was to attach himself to the entourage of some official 
of prominence as an expert secretary-assistant in the hope that he might ride 
upward on his mentor's political coattail. The percentage of male literacy 
in old Burma was unusually high. There were, of course, no state-sponsored 
examinations in any way comparable to the Chinese Civil Service examinations, 
except perhaps in the restricted field of the Buddhist scriptures. Appointments 
to Governorships at the capital or in the provinces were made admittedly on 
grounds of administrative experience and political connections. But standards 
of literary competence were nevertheless recognized in making appointments at 
the Court, in the royal archives, in the Yons (Councils) of the Provincial 
Governors (Myowuns), and also in the leading pagoda library centers. 
Im emergencies, the Court accorded viceregal authority to Governors 
located in important frontier posts like Rangoon. Such persons exercis�d 
military authority as well as civil jurisdiction and were even empowered to 
conduct diploma tic negotiations. .The Burma.n Court, like the Chinese, received 
regular tribute-bearing missions from minor neighboring states (mainly Shan), 
but developed no machi.nery at the capital for entertaining diplomatic missions 
from other than tributary states. The government included, for example, no 
department of foreign affairs and likewise made no provision for permanent 
residence at the capital of foreign diplomatic representatives. The enforced 
presence of a British-Indian Resident at Ava a.nd An1arapura from 1830 to 1840, 
for example, was regarded in Burma as a flagrant derogation of the king's 
authority. It permitted the presence of a foreign co.nspirator-spy within 
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the sacred capital precincts. Commissioner Burney's proposal on one occasion 
to fortify his residency quarters brought a most emphatie veto. 
Ad hoc diplomatic missions visiting the capital, whether Chinese or 
British, were invDriably the particular concern of the Myowun Governors 
assigned to the points of entry, Bhamo in the case of Chinese missions, Peg� 
or Rangoon in the case of the British. These frontier governors were 
responsible for escorting diplomatic visitors to the capital, for providing 
their physical needs en route, and for otherwise expediting the course of 
their negotiations. The cost of such escort services was chargea.ble not to 
the central treasury but to special assessments levied on the unlucky .population
of the province of entry, presumably as penalty for the ineptitude of the 
Myowun in not forestalling the mission itself. !he similarity between this 
practice and Canton Hoppo's assigned responsibility in the eighteenth century 
for controlling China's foreign relations is obvious. 
The semi-feudal aspects of government in old Burma appear to have been 
indigenous in their origins. One of these was the Myosa system, already
referred to, under which the brothers, uncles, and chief wives of the kings 
were each assigned on non-permanent tenure the enjoyment of the royal revenues 
normally collectable from an assigned area or city. The Myosa (literally 
"eater of the city") exercised extensive authority over revenue collections 
within his area,and some police and judicial authority, but not to the 
derogation of all control by royal officials. The Myosa usually kept a small 
band of armed retainers, but he was never a feudal lord in the military sense. 
All subjects of the king includi.ng those living in Myosa areas owed to the 
monarch directly their personal services, including military service, a.n 
obligation which was never diverted to the Myosa. 
Other high officials of the Court not members of royalty were also granted
minor revenue-collecting privileges within more restricted areas to supplement 
their otherwise meager income from commissions and court fees. Provincial 
officials ordinarily took their pay from fees and revenues passing through 
their hands, acting in the time-honored mandarin fashion. After 1861, King
Minden at.tempted to abolish the Myosa system by channelling all revenues into 
a central trea.sury from which salaries and stipends were paid. But the 
difficulties were many, and he experienced much less than complete success 
in this reform effort. 
The authority of the myothugyi, or township headman, differed qualitatively 
from that of governmental officials in that it was hereditary and rooted 
locally. His de facto authority stemmed not from the king but from hereditary­
right as chief and from the voluntary allegiance and loyalty of the people of 
his jurisdiction. The status of every myothugyi was subject to confirmation 
by the Hlutdaw, but such a�thentication was based not on arbitrary royal 
authority, but on evidence of hereditary claims filed in the census archives 
and on the candidate's enjoyment of positive local support. 
In areas of Upper Burma where the royal agricultural lands were allocated 
to the special service a.hmudan groups which provided troops for the capital 
garrison, 'the myothugyi was· normally regime.ntal comrnander and leader of a 
particular asu or service group. The royal lands were apportio.ned in varying 
amounts for the use of families of privates, corporals, sergeants, and lieut­
enants of the several regiments, with a single unit group or daing of three 
to four families respo.nsible for cultivating the land to furnish support for 
members assigned in rotation to military or service duty at the capital. Full 
fledged members of each service asu were tatooed, with appropriate symbols as 
a kind of permanent commitment to their status. As .recognized leader of such 
a regimental group, the ahmudan myothugyi promoted the social interests of his 
group, apportioned peacetime duties' among the_members of his asu, mediated 
disputes, collected royal revenues, and in time of war raised and commanded 
his army co.ntingent. 
The rnyothugyi in Lower Burma exercised territorial as well as personal
jurisdiction over non-service or athi elements of the population. His govern­
mental functions were threefold. He was a police officer, the collector of 
household taxes, and the local recruiter for the army in time· of war. Burman 
folklore quite understandably associated government in general with fire, 
flood, plague, and other malevolent forces, but the myothugyi escaped this 
indictment. The myothugyi protected his people from the rapacity of the 
Goverr1ors and Myosas mainly by underreporting the number of taxable family
units within his jurisdiction and then by apportioning in public sessions the 
total demand as equitably as possible. Technically the myothugyi enjoyed no 
judicial power, but along with other local elders he frequently mediated 
differences developing within his township constituency in a common se.nse 
manner acceptable to the disputants and according to customary law. This 
mediatory function corresponds closely with thr.--at of elders in the Chinese 
community. All crirr�nal cases had to be remanded to the court of the royal 
Myowun. 
Much of the myothugyis local prestige derived from his social role as 
local squire. He staged festivals, helped finance religious celebrations, 
officiated at boat races and marriages, laid out .new irrigation channels. His 
social prestige in fact was maintained far rnore by his open-hande_d generosity 
than by the possession of political or ec.onomic power per se. The greatest 
abuse of the power of the myothugyi developed from his recruiting authority,
especially in athi districts. Since he could call up whom he pleased to meet 
a specified army quota, and he usually began by drafting members of well-to�do 
families, who were able a.nd willi:pg to pay a sum to be excused. He ended by
assembling his force from the poorer families, ·The sums realized in this 
fashion could be used to support the cont�ngent on campaign, but this was not 
invariably the practice. Sometimes the athi myothugyi, in the capacity of 
army sergeant, actually commanded nis own military unit in the field. As the 
vestige of tribal leadership, the myothugyi was virtually the only agency in 
the Burma government which derived its authority and authentication from local 
tradition and which identified itself with the interests of the people. 
A final word concerns the army. The post of commanding general in the 
Burma army was usually held by one of the four 1,.Jungyis or by a royal appointee 
of equivalent rank. Under the general were the Colonels or Bos, usually
civilian political appointees of the king and bound to him by a special loyalty 
oath. The Bos were authorized to ride elephants, to carry gold umbrellas, and 
to be escorted by private retainers. Under the Bo Colonels were the 
professional army officers, captains commanding 80 men, lieutenants over 100 
men, and sergeants heading platoons of 50 men each. The professional ahmudan 
·regiments weretspecialized in character, as infantry, artillery, cavalry,
archers, boatmen, elephantmen, etc., each basic unit operating under its own 
myothugY?: regime.ntal leader. Artillery r$gime.nts in the eighteenth century 
were composed mainly of the half�caste descendants of Christian Portuguese and 
French captives taken off ships at Rangoon. The army of old Burma was strong 
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in its spirit and �lan, but short on discipline, organization, and supply 
services. It declined during the nineteenth century after successive defeats 
at the hands of the British to little more tha.n a rabble. British proximity, 
for one thing, put an end to the morale-building forays of the army into 
neighboring Siam or Manipur. 
It is noteworthy that in the revival of Burman military activity since the 
outbreak of 1:.Jorld 1rJar II, the leader of an armed force of any size, from Aung 
San's National Army to the most disreputable rebel or dacoit band has assumed 
the title of Bo, once reserved for the royally-appointed Colonel of the old 
Burman army. Vulgarization of usage had tended·there as elsewhere to deflate the 
value of the term employed. The tre.dition of semi-anarchy and armed dacoity 
during periods of governmental transition has also been much in evidence since 
194$. 
1fl[hat of the survival value of old Burma's political traditions? An attempt 
may eventually be made to revive the institution of the divine monarchy in 
Burma. The abortive Saya San rebellio.n in 1931 was such an endeavor. It 
involved the appearance of a royal pretender, the establishment of a jungle
capital, and the use of religious incantations and cabalistic tatooing on a 
grand scale� Adipadi Ba Maw tried during the Japanese occupation on a more 
sophisticated basis to develop the aura of kingship, but without notable success. 
·But the Indian pattern is dead and Brahmanical sanctions are wearing thin. 
The sophisticated political views of the youthful leaders of independent Burma 
are inimical to the religious mumbo-jumbo of the past. Premier Nu is more 
traditionally-minded than many of his political associates, but his endeavor 
to use Buddhism as a political weapon against alien ideologies has no precede.nt
in the political traditions of old Burma. Such associates as Ba Swe and Ne Win 
enjoy authority in their own right, _as do many local leaders. 
A new social structure will have to be developed to replace the shattered 
power categories of the British system. Local leadership capable of cooperating 
with the central governme.nt, and cornparable i.n authority to that of the 
traditional hereditary myothugyi will apparently have to be developed. Premier 
Nu t s "self-help" program and his allocation of funds for expenditure by 
responsible local agencies is a step in this direction. Premier Nu himself 
acts as a unifying symbol for widely disparate gro1lps, including Socialists, 
conservative anti-Communists, nationalists, anti-corruptionists and the 
religiously inclined. He is for the time being substituting for the divine 
king, while attempting to publicize the alter.native a.nd contradictory principle 
of popular sovereignty. Briti$h influence survives mainly in the bureaucratic 
administration, in the politically detached status of the High Court, and in 
the deference paid to Parliamentary methods of Cabinet control in an otherwise 
single-party system •. Nehru's leftist and democratic influence is currently 
more influential than that of totalitarian and Communist China. The outcome 
for Burma may well depend on the extent to which the emergent state can 
revitalize constructive aspects of its historic institutions, including the 
responsible leadership of a strong Cabinet-Hlutdaw, the identification of the 
locally-rooted myothugyi chief with the interests of his people, and the 
transference of the high status once accorded to traditional literary
accomplishment and learning to the mastery of the modernized curriculum of 
the schools and university. 
